what procedure is congress supposed to use to fund its programs and control its expenses

Power of the Handbag

Historical Highlight

"All Bills for raising Acquirement shall originate in the House of Representatives; merely the Senate may propose or concur with amendments equally on other Bills."
— U.S. Constitution, Commodity I, section seven, clause 1

"No Money shall exist fatigued from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Business relationship of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Coin shall be published from time to fourth dimension."
— U.S. Constitution, Article I, section ix, clause 7

/tiles/non-collection/i/i_origins_power_purse_approps_lc.xml Prototype courtesy of the Library of Congress The Firm Appropriations Committee in 1918 featuring (from left to right) futurity Secretary of State James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, old Speaker Joseph Cannon of Illinois, Chairman J. Swagar Sherley of Kentucky, future Speaker Frederick Gillett of Massachusetts, future Secretary of State of war James Due west. Good of Iowa, and future Speaker Joseph Byrns of Tennessee.

Congress—and in particular, the House of Representatives—is invested with the "power of the purse," the ability to tax and spend public money for the national government. Massachusetts' Elbridge Gerry said at the Federal Ramble Convention that the House "was more immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a proverb that the people ought to hold the purse-strings."

Origins

English language history heavily influenced the Constitutional framers. The British Business firm of Commons has the exclusive right to create taxes and spend that acquirement, which is considered the ultimate bank check on regal authority. Indeed, the American colonists' cry of "No revenue enhancement without representation!" referred to the injustice of London imposing taxes on them without the do good of a vocalism in Parliament.

Constitutional Framing

Debate at the Ramble Convention centered on two issues. The first was to ensure that the executive would not spend money without congressional potency. The second concerned the roles the Firm and Senate would play in setting fiscal policy.

At the Convention, the framers considered the extent to which the Senate—similar the House of Lords—should be limited in its consideration of budget bills. The provision was part of a compromise between the large and small states. Smaller states, which would be over-represented in the Senate, would concede the power to originate coin bills to the House, where states with larger populations would have greater control. Speaking in favor of the provision, Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania said, "It was a proverb that those who feel, can all-time estimate. This stop would . . . be best attained, if money diplomacy were to be bars to the immediate representatives of the people." The provision in the committee's report to the Convention was adopted, five to three, with iii states divided on the question. The Convention reconsidered the thing over the grade of 2 months, but the provision was finally adopted, nine to 2, in September 1787.

The constitutional provision making Congress the ultimate say-so on regime spending passed with far less argue. The framers were unanimous that Congress, as the representatives of the people, should exist in control of public funds—not the President or executive co-operative agencies. This strongly-held belief was rooted in the framers' experiences with England, where the king had wide latitude over spending once the coin had been raised.

The Early Appropriations Process

The First Congress (1789–1791) passed the beginning appropriations act—a mere thirteen lines long—a few months after it convened. The law funded the government, including important pensions for Revolutionary State of war veterans, with simply $639,000—an corporeality in the tens of millions in existent terms. This simple process was short-lived. Over time, nine regular appropriation bills emerged and funded such priorities every bit pensions, harbors, the post office, and the military. These were considered on an annual basis by the late 1850s. The House Committee on Ways and Means, which besides had jurisdiction over tax policy, controlled the appropriations process. Only legislation and funding were e'er kept carve up. Priorities were spelled out in one constabulary and money appropriated for those priorities in another. This has remained the practice, equally substantive committees pattern say-so acts and the House and Senate Cribbing Committees fund authorized programs later on. Indeed, there are laws and parliamentary rules against making new law in appropriation bills, although such rules are periodically waived.

Subsequent Reforms

In 1865, after the Civil State of war had created a nearly $3 billion national debt and spending exceeded a billion dollars a year, Congress reformed its funding process to handle the government's new demands. The House separated the Ways and Ways Committee'south taxing and spending functions. The Appropriations Commission was established to fund programs, while Ways and Means retained jurisdiction on tax policy. House leadership and other committees also tried to influence the appropriations procedure, and the lack of coordination over the years led to high deficits and the implementation of the federal income tax in 1913. Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Deed in 1921 to address some of the coordination issues it faced funding government programs. This law centralized many of the budgeting functions with the President, who still has considerable agenda-setting power with the federal budget and submits a typhoon budget to Congress at the beginning of every year. The appropriations process has been reformed multiple times since 1921, including notable restructurings with the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Command Act of 1974 and the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Acts of 1985 and 1987.

For Further Reading

Farrand, Max, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Rev. ed. 4 vols. (New Haven and London: Yale Academy Press, 1937).

Garfield, James. "National Appropriations and Misappropriations," North American Review, 270: 572–586.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mathew D. McCubbins. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. (Chicago: The Academy of Chicago Press, 1991).

Kimmel, Lewis. Federal Budget and Financial Policy, 1789–1958. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1959).

Leloup, Lance. The Fiscal Congress. (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1980).

Schick, Allen. Congress and Coin: Budgeting, Spending and Taxing. (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1980).

—. The Federal Upkeep: Politics, Policy, Process. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000).

Selko, Daniel. The Federal Financial System. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Establishment, 1940).

Stewart, Charles H., Iii. Upkeep Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the Business firm of Representatives, 1865–1921. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Wildavsky, Aaron B. Budgeting and Governing. (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006).

—. The New Politics of the Budgetary Process. 5th ed. (New York: Longman, 2003).

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Source: https://history.house.gov/institution/origins-development/power-of-the-purse/

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